Suspicions of Qatar’s larger GCC neighbors acting against Doha, as did occur in 2017, led the Qatari leadership to make greater investments in the diversification of its economic and security relations between November 2014 and June 2017. During this period Qatar established a joint Turkish-Qatari military base in the emirate.
The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) sovereign wealth fund made major investments around the world, from North America and Europe to Russia and East Asia all within the context of Doha’s efforts to provide more internationally influential states with higher stakes in Qatar remaining an independent and sovereign country. In mid-2016, one of the authors of this article spoke to a renowned journalist in Doha, who explained that this diversification of alliances was intended to prevent Qatar from being ‘another Crimea’.
In other words, Qatar wanted to avoid a scenario whereby the Saudis would forcefully annex the emirate and the world would react by tacitly accepting Riyadh’s claims to the right to govern Qatari territory based on historical, linguistic, ethnic, or security factors. The aim was to ensure that under such circumstances the main members of the international community would come to Doha’s defense based on their interests in maintaining relations with an independent Qatar.
Asia
Oil- and gas-thirsty countries in Asia with vibrant, fast-growing, and dynamic economies place much value on their relations with Qatar, the world’s top producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In addition to the economic importance that major Asian countries have placed on Qatar, governments in China, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere in Asia have never perceived the threat that Doha allegedly poses.
Within this context, the ATQ countries found no sympathy for their anti-Qatar campaign in Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and virtually all other Asian capitals. On the contrary, these Asian actors see the GCC crisis as a threat to their own interests, for numerous reasons, and have joined the international community in backing the Kuwaiti emir’s efforts to mediate a settlement to the Gulf dispute.
Sino-Qatari relations have significantly factored into Doha’s ability to maintain a strong posture vis-à-vis the ATQ. On Qatar National Day, the Qatari military paraded a newly-obtained Chinese SY-400 short-range ballistic missile system with a range of approximately 250 miles.
Beijing’s sale of this missile system to Doha underscored the extent to which Qatar successfully gave the Chinese leadership a stake in remaining neutral during the GCC crisis, as opposed to siding with the ATQ. Consequently, possession of this offensive and defensive system has afforded Qatar the possibility to deter its larger neighbors from considering any military action against the blockaded emirate.
Qatar’s turning to China for this ballistic missile system began in 2014, when the ATQ’s Arabian Gulf members withdrew their ambassadors to Doha and when Beijing took part in the 2014 Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition. The Chinese leadership was especially incentivized to make this sale because Qatar is the Communist giant’s second top provider of LNG.
As such, China sought to balance Sino-Qatari trade by taking advantage of Doha’s interest in diversifying its arms sources. By looking to players in the East, Qatar could avoid relying on the Arabian Gulf states’ traditional Western allies which have historically dominated the GCC members’ weapons trade.
Moreover, Beijing and Doha’s budding defense relationship has unfolded within the context of major investments that China has made in Sino-Qatari relations over recent years. Since 2013, the two governments have signed numerous agreements in various domains, including aviation, trade, infrastructure, investment, telecommunications, and currency.
By selling missiles to Doha amid the GCC crisis, Beijing has further consolidated a close relationship between resource-thirsty China and the world’s top producer and exporter of LNG.
Qatar’s role in China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, which seeks to establish China as the center of global trade in the 21st century, helps explain the strong support that Beijing, despite its overall neutral position, has provided Qatar during the GCC’s diplomatic row. As a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Doha was an early backer of OBOR.
Although Qatar is not directly on either the “Belt” or the “Road”, Doha has played a valued diplomatic role over the years in various Middle East and African disputes. Given that geopolitical instability in any part of OBOR’s corridor threatens the success of the initiative, Beijing has much incentive to help Qatar promote mediated settlements and regional stability in general.
Japan has been an important Asian country in terms of Qatar’s post-blockade foreign policy. Deep Japanese-Qatari relations, officially established in 1972 and nurtured during the 1990s when Japan was a pivotal player in the development of Qatar’s burgeoning LNG sector have been key in terms of Doha remaining solvent during the blockade.
Lacking indigenous hydrocarbon resources, Japan has been highly dependent on the oil- and gas-rich GCC states, which account for 15 percent of Japan’s LNG trade (second only to Australia), and eight percent of the Asian country’s oil imports. The future of Tokyo-Doha relations will be important to Japan’s economic health, even as the Japanese seek to diversify their sources of hydrocarbon imports beyond the Middle East.
Beyond the energy trade, Qatar has made itself valuable to Japan in other ways. For example, following the 2010 Fukushima disaster, the Qataris formed the Qatar Friendship Fund, which contributed $100 million to projects that helped Japan deal with the aftermath of the tragedy.
At the same time, officials in Doha opened the Qatar Science Campus in Sendai City and Qatar Sports Park in Shirakawa. Both ventures underscored Doha’s ability to leverage financial resources to gain importance within countries worldwide, including those with the largest and most important economies.
Qatar has remained solvent during the blockade by continuing to export LNG to Japan, South Korea, and other Asian markets, foiling an obvious objective on the part of the Saudi/UAE-led bloc. Although Japan is often overlooked in analyses of Qatari foreign policy, the deep relationship between Doha and Tokyo has been an extremely important factor in Qatar’s strategy to remain resilient throughout the crisis.
Qatar’s ability to remain a food-secure nation is in no small part attributable to Doha’s partnership with India, a country set to play a pivotal role in Qatar’s post-blockade foreign policy. As Qatar’s desert climate and lack of fresh water have challenged (but not prevented) the expansion of local agricultural production, Doha has remained dependent on imports to remain food secure.
Prior to the Gulf dispute, Qatar relied on the Abu Samra crossing at the Qatari-Saudi border for approximately 90 percent of its food imports. The ATQ anticipated that the closure of this crossing would result in a food security crisis in Qatar that would prompt officials in Doha to capitulate to the bloc’s demands.
Yet by turning to India, in addition to Middle East countries closer to home (chiefly Turkey, Iran, and Oman), Qatar successfully restructured food import lines quickly enough to avert any such crisis.
Even prior to the Qatar crisis, India assisted the Qataris with efforts to grow their indigenous agricultural production via joint business and investment ventures. Five years ago, Qatar made a USD 500 million investment in Bush Foods Overseas, a New Delhi-based basmati rice producer, and the emirate has turned to India for assistance with increasing the growth of livestock and crops in Qatar.
Throughout the blockade, such investments have paid dividends for Qatar, which has also benefited from India sending food to the emirate via Mundra and the Jawaharlal Nehru Port.
India’s decision to help Doha circumvent the blockade’s negative impact on Qatari food imports fits into the context of Indian-Qatari relations which have been important for both counties. Qatar’s largest expatriate community is Indian, with roughly 700,000 Indian nationals working in the emirate.
The remittances which these mainly low-skilled workers send home is worth roughly USD 3 billion each year. These workers are set to continue playing an important role in Doha’s preparation for the 2022 World Cup, which will mark a watershed moment in Qatar’s ascendancy and prestige on a global level.
Just as Qatar has made itself extremely important to China and Japan from an energy standpoint, this is also the case regarding India, which is the third top destination for Qatar’s exports. As the Indian economy grows, officials in New Delhi understand that joining the ATQ in severing ties with Doha would severely undermine its fundamental interests.
The ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been important to Qatar’s foreign policy, both before and after the GCC’s diplomatic row broke out. In October 2017, the Emir of Qatar visited three ASEAN countries, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, on a trip planned prior to the eruption of the Gulf dispute.
By paying official visits to these three dynamic Southeast Asian countries, Emir Tamim signaled Doha’s growing interest in cementing Qatar’s ties with the ASEAN bloc. Ultimately, this strategy has served to undermine the ATQ’s potential to isolate Doha globally. Despite the fact that the majority of Qatar-Asian trade is between Doha and Japan, China, India, and South Korea, Qatar’s economic relations with Southeast Asia have contributed to Doha’s ability to weather the storm these past ten months.
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